

The preposition with which my title ends will certainly disturb the linguistically fastidious. But the general public ~~/~~ where they to be asked "What are MPs for?" ~~/~~ would be more worried about the substance than the style of the question. The answer seems too obvious to justify much discussion. Members of Parliament ~~and~~, they would argue, ^{exist} ~~electe~~ to reflect and represent – and when possible implement – the views of the people who elect them – either ^{VOTERS} ~~the electorate~~ in general or the constituency which sends them to Holyrood or Westminster.

CHEERFUL
OF THE
NATION

CHAMPAGNE
110% MORTGAGE
SUB-PRIME PRON
WHAT THE P... U

I propose – from the security of the red benches in the House of Lords – to contest that assumption. I shall argue for a reassertion of the principle which Edmund Burke set out to the Electors of Bristol on

November 3rd 1774. "Your representative owes you not only his industry but also his judgement. And he betrays/instead of serving/you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion." When I entered the House of Commons/fifty years ago/few Members would have contested that proposition. Now/even the minority who have ever heard of it, are inclined to regard it as a romantic relic of less professional parliaments. Peter Lilley – ex-cabinet minister and, according to Margaret Thatcher, a "true believer" in her sort of politics – wrote in the Spectator last month that the increase in parliamentary rebellion was the result of ~~increasing~~ ^{GROWING} pressure on Members from their constituencies – a development ~~about which he~~ ^{which he welcomed. I don't} ~~rejoiced~~. I shall have something to say about rebellions later. But first I want to justify my contention that MPs are now more susceptible to

the pressure of opinion than they have ever been and that the willingness to follow where the electorate leads – although it sounds like democracy – is often its denial.

Burke argued for independently minded MPs because he believed that judgement, in the Commons, was superior to judgement on the streets. I support his contention for quite different reasons. Often politicians say “trust the people” because ~~and~~ ^{and} only when ~~the~~ ^{the} people seem to share their views. Nigel Farage wants to leave Europe but he would repeal the ^{highly popular} ban on smoking in public places. Others ~~are~~ ^{are} purely cynical – enthusiastic for ^{populists} “doing what the people want”/less out of respect for the common-will than a desire for re-election. Most are simply sentimental and believe that men and women of good will – freed of dogmatic

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CONCERN
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distractions – would choose to do, in their phrase,
“what works.” They – like the proponents of
elected mayors in the English cities and so called
‘open ~~selection~~ conferences’ for ^{AVOIDING} ~~the choice of~~
^{THE SELECTION OF}
candidates – want to take the politics out of politics.
I do not. I want politicians with coherent and
consistent ideological positions. That is essential to
the choice on which real democracy is built. I do not
say that politicians with deeply held convictions ~~can~~
should never yield under pressure. But I certainly
reject the theory of government which makes it a
virtue.

The temptation to accept second hand convictions
has increased with the years. Sophisticated opinion
polls have provided politicians with what seems, at
first glance, (I emphasise seems) a sure and certain
route map to victory. I do not suggest that opinion

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polls could or should be banned or restricted. I simply observe that Gladstone and Disraeli had to rely on anecdotal evidence about ^{the level of} support for what they did. I think that Gladstone would have gone ahead with his second Home Rule Bill, even if a nineteenth century YouGov or Mori had told him of its unpopularity. ^{BUT} He was spared the anguish of choosing between principle and judgement / on one hand / and power on the other. Gladstone would, undoubtedly have chosen principle and – realising that polls are no more than a snapshot of opinion at one time – gone out into the country and campaigned as he campaigned in Midlothian during 1879.

One of the strange features of modern ^{populist} politics is the apparent belief that public opinion cannot be changed. Take the case of the European Union. A

series of surveys suggest that it is unpopular. When will the true believers begin to evangelise ^{TO CHANGE} on its behalf? ^{AT PRESENT} All the main parties ^{CRAVELLY} edge away from support with demands which range from the threat of outright withdrawal to the idea, invented by MPs who want to stay in, that we should have a referendum about getting out. There are only two sorts of speeches about the European Union. One denounces it is an unmitigated disaster. The other says that it is not quite as bad as the disaster mongers suggest. ~~No wonder no one likes it.~~ Yet I would gamble that a large majority of MPs regard EU membership as immensely beneficial. ^{TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST} In this particular Burke's view on the superiority of ^{THEY} MPs judgement is correct. What a pity ~~our MPs~~ are not as brave as they are wise. ^{POPULISM - TO SETTLE}
^{→ MORE IRISH CAN REACH}

The reluctance to evangelise is also based on a

deeply depressing view of human nature – the belief that votes are always cast on the basis of “What’s in it for me?” Last week, Lord (Andrew) Adonis queried the point of campaigning against the English ‘bed-room tax’ on the grounds that it was levied on only a small number of tenants. I both like and admire Adonis so I can only assume that he momentarily overlooked ^{two} ~~the~~ facts. The first is that the ‘bedroom tax’ is wrong in itself” The second is that – if we evangelise to that effect – tens of thousands of families who live in security and comfort – could be persuaded to oppose it. ~~ON MARGINAL G.~~

TO USE NOT UNFASHIONABLE WORD – ON MARGINAL G.

But, back to Burke who had very little to say on campaigning. His dictum on duty concerned the pressure of constituency rather than national opinion and it is that leverage away from judgement and conscience that, on the evidence of

^{MPs}
~~recent~~ speeches, has increased in recent years. I
take only one example – the debate in the House of
Commons on intervention in Syria. Member after
Member said that constituency/^{OPINION} determined his or
^{OPINION}
her vote. After the defeat of the government
motion, John Mann, the Labour Member for
Bassetlaw and Andrew Percy, the Conservative
Member for Brigg and Goole ~~both~~ announced that
they had polled opinion within their constituents
and found its residents opposed to war. Both
Members deserve congratulations for their
assiduity – and for the good fortune of representing
constituents who shared their view on Syria. But a
question immediately arises. How would they have
voted at the end of the House of Commons debate
if their constituents had demanded an immediate
air strike against Assad?

If they would have voted against war, in any event, the polling exercise was, at best, a token of respect and, at worst, a public relations gimmick. If they would have voted against their conscience and judgement, a crucial question – the first theme of this lecture – arises. What sort of Member of Parliament is willing to be the vehicle for views which he or she does not hold? Why should anyone with integrity and ability want to go to parliament – low pay and lower esteem – if the job required the parrot like repetition of second-hand convictions. If MPs automatically “do what the people want”, they might as well be replaced by opinion polls and calculating machines. There was one Member of Parliament – still alive, so I shall not name him – about whom it was said that, if you asked him the time, he would reply “What time would you like it

to be?" He lost his seat – by a tiny margin – in a general election by agreeing to support policies which were imposed on him by wholly unrepresentative cliques within his local party. Local opinion often turns out to be the view of that highly dangerous animal, the single-issue activist.

MPs are now closer to their constituents than at any time in our history – the result of the additional resources provided by the House of Commons, communication via social media and a very ~~well~~ welcome reduction in deference. The change is easily illustrated. ^{BY THE DRAINAGE OF EXCISE} In 1885, the Marquis of Hartington received a letter which read, "I have been required by several leading Liberals in the Rossendale Division to ask you if you will kindly receive a deputation whose object is to induce you to become candidate for that Division." Eighty five

years later, George Darling, selected as candidate for the Hillsborough Division of Sheffield was given a standing ovation when he offered to visit the constituency once a month. Six weeks later, when he became parliamentary private secretary to the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, the constituency wrote to him, /absolutely gratuitously, /to say that they would understand if his onerous duties made it impossible to keep the promise. Those days are over. MPs are required to merge into their constituencies. When Michael Portillo interviews potential Conservative candidates, he tells them that they will be required to move their whole families into the constituency which selects them.

I am strongly in favour of a close relationship between MPs and their ^{LOCALITIES} ~~constituencies~~. One of the

strengths of the relationship is that nobody now believes that the MP is doing a favour by spending time on case work. The constituency needs him or her and he or she needs the constituency. It is the clear duty of the back bench MPs to use all the parliamentary means at their disposal – early day motions, questions and adjournment debates – to argue his or her constituency's cause. But no reasonable view of parliamentary government can endorse the view that Members must put constituency interests above all else. There must be MPs along the route of HS2 who – unlike me – regard that railway as essential to the commercial life of the country. ^{THEY} Yet ^{they} know that their constituents are profoundly opposed to their lives being disrupted by its development. Those MPs have a duty to consider the national as well as the local

interest. They are representatives not delegates. I

THEY ARE

MY EXPERTISE

know ~~it~~ is not easy. In my early years as a very

FROM WARDEN ~~AS I PROPOSE TO DECISIONS BY~~

junior minister – Joint Parliamentary Secretary to

the Ministry of Labour – I was required to give my

blessing to Industrial Development Certificates

which were aimed at diverting investment from the

“over-heated” West Midlands to the under-

employed North East. I admit that one of my

motives, in agreeing, was a desire to remain in the

government. But, despite being a West Midland

MP, I agreed with a clear conscience. I believed that

a regional policy was good for the nation as a whole.

The dilemma arose in a more dramatic form in

1964. Down the road from my constituency, the

Conservatives were winning Smethwick, against the

trend, with the slogan “If you want a nigger for a

neighbour, vote Labour.” Had I followed what I

knew to be constituency opinion I would, undoubtedly, have called for the compulsory repatriation of Commonwealth immigrants. I trembled and I faltered. ^BBut in the end I said that my constituents were wrong. I thought of it then – as I think of it now – not as arrogance but as self-respect. This is the second theme of this lecture. Had I, in 1964, followed what was undoubtedly constituency opinion, I would not have been worth re-electing in 1966. I won by 1200 votes. For most of the count, it seemed that I had lost. I have to admit that [/]as my opponents votes stretched past mine down the table, [/]Burke's endorsement was not much consolation.

Doubts about the diminishing belief in the Burke's dictum can be confirmed by reference to the House of Commons' web-site description of a Member's

duties. It lists the four reasons which might prevent an MP meeting his or her constituents' wishes. The adverse effect on other constituents. The limitation on ministers' freedom of action. Inability to deal with issues covered by devolved powers. Conflicts with party policy. The inhibition that results from a conflict between the constituent's wishes and the MP's conscience or judgement does not rate a mention. ~~Mercifully it places no great emphasis on the role of MPs as social workers.~~ Dealing with the needs of individual constituents is an essential part of an MP's obligation. But democracy is damaged when its extent is regarded as a criteria by which the right to re-election is judged. My Liberal Democrat friends tell me that "constituency work" will see many of their sitting MPs back into parliament despite the party's unpopularity.

Elections ought to be about rival ideas, not broken paving stones and water-tight bus shelters.

In my experience, the most exacting test of MPs' determination to follow their own convictions concern local rather than national issues and sometimes issues which have nothing at all to do with politics. For three difficult years, I was publicly identified with what I called incomes' policy and what trade unionists in the Sparkbrook Labour Party called wage restraint. We lived in amicable/if sometimes voluble/disagreement. It was the proposed closure of the Sorrento Maternity Hospital which resulted in the only bitter disagreement – MP versus both constituency party and local opinion – that disturbed our thirty-three year partnership.

The Sorrento Maternity Hospital had once been the home of a local builder and was named after the town in which he spent his honeymoon. The delivery room was in its outbuildings and newly born infants and their mothers were conveyed on stretchers, precariously balanced on trolleys, across a bumpy yard into a ward within the house itself. If it was raining, mother and baby were protected by a tarpaulin. The proposal that it should be closed in favour of a new maternity unit in the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, seemed to me an obvious blessing. To the people who voted for me it appeared an affront – the submergence of “their own” hospital in a huge and daunting complex at least one bus journey away. As I would not have wanted – perhaps even allowed – my own wife or daughter to give birth in the Sorrento, I refused to

fight its closure.

Moral, perhaps even intellectual issues immediately arose. My wife or daughter were no more than part of a hypothesis. Expectant mothers within my constituency were real people. What right had I to right to reject the preference of the families which used the hospital in the belief that I knew more about their welfare than they knew themselves? P

The allegation against me was arrogance – a common criticism of MPs who reject majority opinion. In vain did I argue that I was elected to make such judgements and that democracy was served by their ability – if they found my judgement intolerable – to replace me. Of course we all knew that the right-to-replace argument was stronger in text books than on the streets of inner city Birmingham. ~~So we were left with arrogance – the~~

IN THIS CASE I MAY CERTAINLY
accusation that I believed that I knew best. I am ^{NOT}
YOU WILL BE SURPRISED TO HEAR ME SAY IT BUT I MAY HAVE REFLECTED
still not sure if, in that case, Burke's dictum applied

I certainly rejected the ~~good~~ advice about "not
restraining men for their own good" as set out by
John Stuart Mill – after Adam Smith the philosopher
most quoted by politicians who have either never
read or do not understand him.

Burke's advice solely concerned MPs' relations with
their constituents but it seems to me that the same
OF INDEPENDENT JUDGEMENT SHOULD
rules apply to other aspects of their work –
including the duty of the private member (back
bencher) to hold the executive (government) to
account. That duty dates back to the years when
the executive was the sovereign and did not owe its
authority, indeed its existence, to the composition
of the House of Commons. Once executive powers
were exercised by a cabinet – selected from and

dependent on parliament itself – the duty to hold the executive to account was eroded, at least for supporters of the government, by the obligation of loyalty. The party system polarised the process.

Holding to account became the job of the Official Opposition. Government supporters only exercised that right on carefully chosen occasions –

sometimes when great issues of principle and national importance were in dispute, more often when the gesture of dissent did little or nothing to imperil the Administration's future

If – as you should – you read The Blunders of our

Government by Anthony King and Ivor Crewe, you

will marvel that such great sums of money could ^{HAVE BEEN} ~~be~~

squandered without censure and ^{PUNISHMENT} ~~penalty~~.

One of the reasons that such errors rarely result in

penalties is the party system. The waste, even

when it is detected, is excused and justified by government supporters. When it is identified by the opposition, the complaints are brushed aside a no more than a feature of the party game. ^{THAT BEING SAID} But the government ^{IS} ~~has been~~ held to account more often than the cynics realise. Over the last three years there have been thirty U-turns – shorthand for changes of policy forced upon the government. Michael Gove has made so many U-turns that he has almost disappeared up his own Bacculaureate. Most of the policy changes were initially stimulated by public opinion, but eventually forced on the government by the House of Commons Select Committees joining in the chorus of disapproval. In Select Committees MPs often feel sufficiently relaxed to use their own judgement ~~and hold the executive to account.~~ ^{SO} ~~And~~ in one particular ^{AND IT IS NOT THE ONLY EXAMPLE OF}

democracy ^{ADVANCE} has made a great advance.

The later Stuart parliaments – wanting to prevent Charles II from supporting French pretensions in the Low Countries – were frustrated by the King's use of the Royal Prerogative. Although theoretically David Cameron has that instrument at his disposal, he did not use it in order to override the Commons opposition to British involvement in a punitive strike against the Assad regime. He told us that his self-denying ordinance was the result of his respect for democracy. That noble instinct was, of course, encouraged by the knowledge that ⁷ to have ignored the will of parliament ⁷ would have been to encompass ⁷ sooner or later ⁷ his own destruction. Paradoxically, the Royal Prerogative was destroyed by Tony Blair's cavalier attitude towards parliament at the outset of the Second Iraq War. Robin Cook's

gravestone is inscribed with his own epitaph on the parliamentary revolt which followed the decision to invade. "I may not have succeeded in halting the war, but I did secure the right of parliament to decide on war."

Cook may well have achieved more than he realised. There is good reason to believe that if the resolution – action against Iraq but not until the House of Commons has explicitly approved it – been passed, Parliament would have been reconvened on the following Sunday ~~in the~~ expectation that the second motion would be ^{PASSED} ~~approved~~ and the rockets would have been launched next day. The Labour opposition and thirty-odd usual supporters of the government stopped it and made way for what may turn out to be Syrian peace talks.

So parliament – or more particularly the House of Commons – can and does from time to time fulfil its traditional duty to restrain. But the circumstances have to be right. The parliamentary arithmetic usually insures that a vote to change the government's mind and policy can only be carried if it attracts the support of some of the government's own back benchers. ^{1st factor} ~~So~~ "holding the executive to account" ^{USUALLY} requires rebellion. It does not necessarily require a defeat in the division which ends the crucial debate – the dramatic declarations of defiance from below the gangway and the tense pause before the tellers read out the vote. In 1940, the resolution which effectively exonerated the government from all blame for the defeat in Norway was carried with a majority of eighty one.

^{BUT} Forty Tory back benchers voted "No" and sixty

abstained. ^{And} But the speeches had so damaged the Prime Minister that he was forced to resign. MPs can do their duty in many diverse ways.

Rebellion is, from time to time, essential to parliamentary democracy. That is my third ~~essential~~ precept. But revolt should not happen too often.

Unless the governing party can count on the regular, if not invariable, support of its backbenchers our system of parliamentary government cannot function. Constant rebellion is often the product of vanity, eccentricity or, the worst of all political diseases, the MP's need to read his or her name in the papers. I accuse Mr Philip Hollobone – who says it is his duty to speak for Kettering in the Commons not the Commons in Kettering – of none of those sins. But I do note that – according to the survey of rebellion carried out by Nottingham

University – he voted against the government he supports on 129 occasions in three years. It is not easy to understand what he hoped to achieve from a record of rebellion that was undoubtedly eclectic. He may sum up his rebellion in the single word “conscience”. Mr Attlee said that conscience should be a still small voice not a loud speaker. Nor should it sound like a needle stuck in an old fashioned gramophone record. *OTHERWISE THEY ARE DEVALUED*

Rebellions within opposition parties do not, by definition, have the same effect as rebellions within the government. But they can give government policy an impetus which it would otherwise lack. In 1970 sixty-eight Labour MPs – John Mackintosh and I among them – voted against our party whip in favour of a government motion endorsing Britain’s application to join what we then called the

Common Market. The immediate result was the general acceptance that Common Market membership – having supported so wide a spectrum of support – must be in the national interest. The long-term results of what we did that day illustrates the often unintended consequences of a major revolt. All unknowing, we set in train a series of events which, ~~although wholly unintended,~~ ~~and what~~ now seem inevitable consequences for the English political system. The apostates developed a taste for apostasy. Roy Jenkins resigned as Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, the so called “Gang of Four” defected and the Social Democratic Alliance transmuted into the Liberal Democratic Party. English politics has now returned more or less to its old form. Liberal Democrats behave as the old Liberals did and receive about the

same level of support. But for thirty years the consequences of the 1970 rebellion reverberated around English politics. I therefore admit – with some embarrassment - that, had I not defied the Whip forty years ago, Dr Vincent Cable might never have become a cabinet minister.

I had no idea, back in 1970, whether or not my constituents wanted Britain to join the Common Market, but I had no doubt, two years earlier, that I had their complete support when I voted for the Commonwealth Immigration Bill which broke the promise made to Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian Asians at the time of independence that if any of those countries began a programme of “Africanisation”, they would be immediately let into Britain. Not opposing that Bill is the biggest regret of my three decades in parliament. My motives

were mixed. One was indefensible. I did not want to resign my very junior membership of the administration. But I was also influenced by my belief in party government and the obligation, in general to “vote the ticket.”

You are now saying to yourselves that in a single sentence I have contradicted all I have asserted about MPs independence. You are wrong. It is both intellectually respectable and consistent with support for Burke’s dictum to argue that an MP’s judgement should normally lead them to vote according to the party whip. Party solidarity is essential to the efficient working of the administration. If new MPs do not understand that before their election, acceptance of that fact is imposed upon them from the day on which they take their seats. Everything about the House of

Commons – from its architecture to its procedures – emphasises the party prerogative. The MPs' first duty is to act as part of an informal electoral college – determining, on the strength of party support, who shall be Prime Minister. The next task is to approve or reject the Sovereign's Speech from the Throne" – a statement of one party's programme. Nothing in the early impressionable weeks is related to the demands of constituents, conscience and judgement.

That omission can be, indeed is, justified by what we will call the Theory of the Manifesto and the Mandate. Despite the romantic pretensions of independent candidates, we know that one MP - acting on his or her own in the normal circumstances of a government with a working majority - can achieve very little. The only election

promise that is worth making is the assurance that, if a collection of like-minded candidates become a majority in the House of Commons, they will use their combined strength to carry through a programme to which they all subscribe. ^{THE PROGRAM} British government is party government and the electorate know it. ^{THE MANIFESTO} That is why they predominantly cast their votes for parties rather than candidates. In the general election of 1992, I polled 19,000 votes. Despite my twenty-eight years of service, I doubt if 1,000 of them were cast for me as an individual. They voted for me because I was Labour. ~~Some~~ ^{Some} hoped for a Labour Government. A constituency which, at a general election, is offered the services of a candidate who promises to reflect its local needs rather than follow the demands of a party programme almost always loses his or her deposit.

If you doubt it, ask Ester Rantzen.

My claim that the manifestos are bed-rock of democracy is, complicated by the fact that the promises which it contains are often broken and few members of the electorate actually know what those promises are. Indeed they are rarely read outside the ranks of political *aficionados*. But there is also an implied manifesto - the general assumptions about the sort of programme for which the two major parties in England and the nationalists in Scotland stand. Whatever the Conservatives do or say about the health service, they are assumed “not to be trusted” with its management. Whatever Labour says or does about immigration it is thought to be “soft” on the subject. In 1983, my election address, was explicit in rejecting three major planks in Labour’s platform –

nuclear disarmament, withdrawal from what was then the European Community and nationalisation of the economy's commanding heights. Even after Robin Day had made a fuss, on radio, about my rejection of what he called "half the manifesto", not one voter in my constituency ever even mentioned my apostasy. I was Labour. That was enough.

OBJECTION TO NEW LABOUR
CANT BEEM DEEM
PEOPLE VOTED IN THE BLOOR

The manifesto at least offers voters the *chance* to support or reject the outline of a feasible programme and a party which generally represents their hopes and aspirations. It also helps politicians defeat the forces within the establishment that attempt to stand between politicians their principles and their promises. In 1951, Harold Macmillan, Minister of Housing, was told by his civil servants that it was not possible to build 300,000 houses in a year. He replied, "But we must. It was in

the manifesto.” And 300,000 houses were built. Of course to be inviolate, a manifesto promise has to be feasible. The Clegg declaration on student grants and fees could never have been implemented. That was an example of misuse of the manifesto – the hope of popularity rather than the description of a programme. But, properly employed, the manifesto is central to democracy .

The theory has to be adjusted to deal with the phenomenon of peacetime coalition government. When no one party is able to command a majority it is unable – or can claim to be unable – to keep its promises. The need to construct a programme of government, after the election is over, makes coalition, in one sense, a negation of democracy. The notion that a stalemate is, in itself, a statement of the national mood is, of course, nonsense. In

2000, ^{some} people voted Conservative, Labour, Liberal, SNP or for one of the parties on the wilder shores of politics. Nobody voted for coalition. But we have to face the fact that coalition may well become the usual, rather than the exceptional form of government. That is one, though only one, of the reasons why I have come belatedly to support proportional representation. PR would make coalition inevitable. The electorate would know, before the election, that manifestos represented hopes rather than *commitments* and that they were voting for government *a la carte*.

So, although I do believe in the propriety of party government, I still – perhaps quixotically – hold the view that the Burke's classical definitions of the MPs role is not completely out-dated. The two notions of an MP's duty – obligations to conscience

and judgement on one hand and to the party and its manifesto on the other - are not irreconcilable. I can, indeed do, argue that I am a Labour Party member because I believe the good society to be the equal society and I ~~judge~~ *judge* – the operative verb - that Labour is the party most likely to pursue that objective. In general I must therefore act in a way which sustains it. But that does not mean that I should never break ranks. In 1971, I voted – night and day – for Barbara Castle's attempts to wreck the Heath industrial relations reforms - although I thought her position was indefensible. I judged that unity was essential to the wellbeing of the party in which my hopes of a better society resided. Had I been in the House of Commons at the time, I would have voted against the party whip and the invasion of Iraq for exactly the same reason. I defied the

whip at the end of the debate on Common Market membership in 1970 and I should have done so when the Labour Government introduced the Commonwealth Immigration Bill in 1967.

Rebellion is essential, but it is devalued if it happens with the regularity of, shall we say Mr Phillip Hollobone. If the Westminster parliament was made up of 650 Mr Hollobone's government would be impossible. But one or two Mr Hollobones add to the gaiety of politics and the discerning, selective rebel is essential to upright politics. John Macintosh was such a Member of Parliament

So, can we lay down rules, or even guidelines, which determine when individual MPs should conform and when they should rebel? Of course we cannot. We can say that they must respond to the calls of

conscience, but we cannot determine where their consciences should lead. We can say that they must always exercise their personal judgement, but that would lead to the breakdown of our system of party government. We can say that they must put principle above preferment and self-respect above re-election, but that, over a parliamentary life of several decades, would only be possible for Members with a saintly disposition. So we ask them to stumble along – pragmatically as our constitution requires. The result, at least in my case, is pride that I took part in one great parliamentary revolt and guilt that, at least once, I conformed when conformity was indefensible.